

## CIVIL AFFAIRS – VANGUARD FOR THE EMERGING ARMY RESERVE PROFESSION

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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PROFESSION**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The deployment of tens of thousands of Reserve Soldiers for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) has changed the Department of Defense's (DoD) perspective toward the Reserve Component. The DoD concluded that it must manage its Reserve Components as an operational force. One heavily deployed segment within the Reserve Components in support of the Global War on Terror is U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA). As United States forces in Iraq and Afghanistan execute a counterinsurgency war, Civil Affairs are in the forefront of this effort. Moreover, with 95% of the Civil Affairs units residing in the Army Reserve, the contribution of Reserve personnel is especially significant. Today, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs Corps are indisputable members of the military profession. However, USAR Civil Affairs faces challenges, both ongoing and emerging, that it must confront in order to maintain unequivocal membership in this profession. This project examines USAR Civil Affairs forces against the four traditional concepts that define professionalism: jurisdiction, legitimacy, expertise, and career. Areas of progress are identified and recommendations are provided to overcome challenges and potential setbacks for Army Reserve Civil Affairs.



## CIVIL AFFAIRS – VANGUARD FOR THE EMERGING ARMY RESERVE PROFESSION

No man ever reached to excellence in any one art or profession without having passed through the slow and painful process of study and preparation.

—Horace  
Ancient Roman Poet, 65 BC- 8 BC

For the past several years, Reserve Soldiers of the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC(A)) have served as the marketing image for the United States Army Reserve's recruitment efforts. With the largest contingent of parachutist positions in the Army Reserve, the maroon-bereted USACAPOC(A) Soldiers and their officer leadership exemplify the "Airborne Leads the Way" ethos. As a subordinate command of the United States Army Special Operations Command until 1 October 2006, USACAPOC(A) units conveyed a "tip of the spear" aura. The high operational tempo of USACAPOC(A) units in the past decade in support of worldwide, full-spectrum operations is significantly higher than that of other Reserve units. The noncontiguous battlespace of Afghanistan and Iraq ensures that Soldiers of all status – active or reserve, combat or combat support – share the dangers and intensity of combat. Does all this make the United States Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs (CA) officer corps professional? In short, the answer is "No." The confirmation of USAR Civil Affairs as true members in the "management of violence," a term coined by the late Samuel B. Huntington in describing the military profession, is better evidenced by the tenets of the military profession, and professionalism has never been more important.<sup>1</sup> The necessity of Civil Affairs in the pursuit of national strategy has never been more pronounced. U.S. military intervention in the reconstruction of weak and failed states, whether pre- or post-conflict, is a trend that is unlikely to change in the

foreseeable future. In this environment, USAR Civil Affairs Corps has emerged as an essential military capability – suggesting the need to ensure their officers are full professionals. This paper provides an overview of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs today; a review of past scholarly treatments of the military profession; an assessment of the USAR Civil Affairs officer corps within the framework of military professionalism; and a potential way ahead for USAR Civil Affairs branch to prepare for its future within the military profession.

### U.S. Army Civil Affairs Today

On 1 October 2006, Headquarters, USACAPOC(A) transferred control of its Active Component (AC) CA element to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Simultaneously, USACAPOC(A) and its Reserve Component (RC) units were assigned to the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). Currently the operational civil affairs elements of USACAPOC(A) consists of 4 civil affairs commands, 7 civil affairs brigades, and 28 civil affairs battalions. There are 2,200 officer positions within the CA force structure with over 40% of those requiring the Civil Affairs military occupational specialty (38A).<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of these CA forces is to “provide the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment.”<sup>3</sup> The five core tasks of CA operations are populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA).<sup>4</sup> In describing its uniqueness, and hence the basis of Civil Affairs expertise, the Army’s *Commissioned Officer Professional Development Management Guide* cites, “CA forces provide military capabilities not available

elsewhere in the armed forces such as regional orientation, language, cross-cultural communication, and civilian acquired skills.”<sup>5</sup> Approximately 96% of the Army’s CA capability resides in the Army Reserves.<sup>6</sup> The proponency for Civil Affairs resides within U.S. Special Operations Command. These facts are integral to the analysis of the USAR Civil Affairs branch as a profession.

### Study of the Profession

In order to assess the status of the USAR Civil Affairs officer as part of the military profession, one must first define the term *profession*. The U.S. Army considers itself as a profession:

The purpose of any profession is to serve society by effectively delivering a necessary and useful specialized service. To fulfill those societal needs, professions – such as medicine, law, the clergy, and the military – develop and maintain distinct bodies of specialized knowledge and impart expertise through formal, theoretical, and practical education.<sup>7</sup>

Rigorous study on the subject has occurred both within and from outside the military. Scholars cite Samuel P. Huntington’s work as the genesis of modern thought on the subject. His book, *The Soldier and the State*, published in 1957 defined the military profession while analyzing the general state of civil-military relations in American society. He identified three distinguishing characteristics of a profession: *responsibility*, *corporateness*, and *expertise*. He defined responsibility as “working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society.”<sup>8</sup> He identified corporateness as the shared “sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen.”<sup>9</sup> Lastly, he termed expertise as the “specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor.”<sup>10</sup> Against these criteria, Huntington viewed the

U.S. military's officer corps as an emerging profession. However, he did not include reserve officers in this group. Morris Janowitz in his book, *The Professional Soldier*, also noted the emergence of a professional military. He saw a requirement for expertise and envisioned the professional as the product of a "prolonged training, [who] acquires a skill which enable[s] him to render specialized service."<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Janowitz echoed the corporateness or career aspect of the military profession as he described the military officer corps as a "professional group [that] develops a sense of group identity and a system of internal administration."<sup>12</sup> He implies a full time occupation.

Andrew Abbott, in a more recent book, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Labor*, introduced the concept of jurisdiction, as a "social tie...that binds profession and task – a recognized right, a legitimate link between the two."<sup>13</sup> Don M. Snider, with his anthology, *The Future of the Army Profession*, has provided a contemporary treatment of the military and professionalism – concluding that military officers are professionals.<sup>14</sup> Specific to the Army Reserves, Dallas D. Owens's chapter in the same work, "From Reserve to Full Partner: Transforming Reserve Professionals," develops a framework for determining the extent to which Army RC Soldiers are members of the military profession. He discusses the concepts of *jurisdiction*, *legitimacy*, *career*, and *expertise*.<sup>15</sup>




Figure 1. Concepts Central to the Army RC Professional

These concepts are useful in considering the professionalism of the USAR Civil Affairs.

## Analysis

*Jurisdiction.* The Army Reserve Civil Affairs Corps possesses professional jurisdiction. Andrew Abbott introduced the matter of jurisdiction into the calculus that defines a profession. He states that “jurisdictional claims...have three parts: to classify a problem, to reason about it, and take action on it.”<sup>16</sup> He further classifies jurisdiction into degrees or subordinations. Full jurisdiction represents the complete claim to a problem. Specifically, it is the condition where an organization has the exclusivity to classify the problem, to reason about the problem, and to act on the problem.

Intellectual jurisdiction reflects a state where a dominant profession retains “cognitive control of the jurisdiction, while allowing practical jurisdiction to be shared more widely.”<sup>17</sup> In other words, having the right to classify and reason about it but not necessarily to take action on it. Another jurisdiction, advisory, occurs when a profession has an “advisory control over certain aspects of the work.”<sup>18</sup> If holding distinct jurisdiction is a requirement for determination as a profession, the question regarding USAR Civil Affairs “is there a domain within which it can claim jurisdiction”?

There is ample evidence that supports USAR Civil Affairs having full jurisdiction.

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3 states:

Employment of civilian core competencies by the CA Functional Specialist, found exclusively in the USAR, enables the force to assess, monitor, protect, reinforce, establish, and transition political, economic, social, and cultural institutions, and capabilities to achieve U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations.<sup>19</sup>

The exclusive residing of functional specialists in the USAR, as opposed to other components, branches, and services, greatly strengthens the claim for jurisdiction.

Likewise, the 2004 National Military Strategy emphasizes full spectrum domination –

“the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”<sup>20</sup> CA forces enable the commander to execute civil-military operations (CMO), which are conducted across full spectrum operations. Hence, CA forces are integral to full spectrum domination. Similarly, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, issued 28 November 2005, cites:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.<sup>21</sup>

As witnessed over the last two decades, the U.S. military has been immersed in stability operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In these operations, the functional specialists embedded in USAR Civil Affairs units were vital in achieving the long-term goal of “develop[ing] indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.”<sup>22</sup> However, USAR Civil Affairs exclusivity in stability operations becomes diluted when “the requirement for militaries to work as part of a larger team alongside civilian agencies is increased.”<sup>23</sup>

Although, the DoD directive states that such efforts are best completed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals, experience has shown that success is achieved when the military takes the lead. The military, with USAR Civil Affairs as its agent, possesses the attributes to lead other organizations in stability operations. It conducts operations exclusively due to “guaranteed functioning under the most adverse circumstances, with the necessary ‘force protection’ to carry out tasks.”<sup>24</sup> The often-quoted line, attributed to the former UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld,

illustrates this phenomenon, “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.”<sup>25</sup> Thus, CA officer professionalism is linked to the key military jurisdiction of the management of violence.

However, USAR Civil Affairs shares the domain with Marine Corps Civil Affairs Groups (CAG), a recently emerged Navy CA element – the Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG), and a growing Active Component Civil Affairs force. The two Marine Corps CAGs are reserve organizations that are equivalent in size to a USAR Civil Affairs battalion – 190 personnel. Each Marine CAG supports a Marine Expeditionary Force. The Marine Corps has not indicated any future expansion to this CA capability. Not only have CAGs been limited historically to supporting only Marine units, Marine ground forces in Iraq required the reinforcement of Army USAR Civil Affairs units. The Navy’s MCAGs, established in March 2007, consists of two coastal squadrons with a force of approximately 300 personnel. With an MCAG mission to execute civil affairs operations in the maritime environment and to support strictly naval units, there is little likelihood that USAR Civil Affairs’ jurisdiction in land warfare will be encroached. Within the Army, the Active Component CA capability has nearly doubled in size in the past few years from 409 spaces to 884.<sup>26</sup> Yet with the corresponding growth in USAR Civil Affairs, the AC capability remains at approximately 4% of total Army CA. Currently Active Component CA focuses on supporting special operations forces missions.

There is the potential that USAR Civil Affairs may have to share more CA jurisdiction outside the military. The past two decades have demonstrated the Department of Defense’s dominance in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. In “develop[ing] whole of government initiatives to promote global

stability”, there is a growing sense that the Department of State (DoS) may assume greater responsibility in these endeavors.<sup>27</sup> As DoD Directive 3000.05 asserts, trained professionals outside of the military best perform many stability operations tasks. In 2004, in an effort to play a greater role in the nation’s response to failing and post-conflict states, the DoS created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Its core mission...

...to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.<sup>28</sup>

Although this mission is limited to coordinating and institutionalizing the U.S. Government’s civilian component, the potential for jurisdictional clash with the military’s CA effort is apparent. The S/CRS’s Advance Civilian Teams (ACT) report to the Embassy, or existing United States Government (USG) presence, and thus creates a parallel chain to military CA, which ordinarily reports to a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. The Embassy, or existing USG presence, has only a coordinating relationship with the JTF commander. This condition is ripe for violating the unity of effort principle. The S/CRS’s Standby Response Corps (SRC) and Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), from which the ACTs come, have much in common with USAR Civil Affairs. For example, the SRC are civilian agency employees who have ongoing job responsibilities but are trained and available for deployments lasting from 30 days to 180 days.<sup>29</sup> With current funding limited to staffing and training only a fraction of the CRC’s intended 250-person active component and 2000-person standby component, the S/CRS does not constitute a direct rival to CA. Likewise, CRC’s ability to operate in hostile or semi-permissive environments without relying on the military for force

protection is unclear. However, it does represent a way ahead if a future administration decides to fund a greater DoS role. Despite the emergence of similar organizations within and outside the Department of Defense, Army Reserve Civil Affairs Corps' jurisdiction is likely to remain unchallenged in the years ahead. While USAR Civil Affairs' jurisdiction may be encroached, its claim to legitimacy is less an issue.

*Legitimacy.* USAR Civil Affairs possesses legitimacy as a dimension of its profession. In this dimension, there is less delineation between USAR and AC Civil Affairs. Legitimacy is the most abstract of Owens' four dimensions. Legitimacy hinges on the acceptance of Civil Affairs as a science. Does Civil Affairs contain a department of systematized knowledge as an object of study? Evidence of legitimacy is the profession's offering of impartial, disinterested, and self-sacrificial service.<sup>30</sup> Of Huntington's three distinguishing characteristics of a profession, legitimacy closely relates to *responsibility*. Any examination of legitimacy focuses on answering three questions: Does the function of USAR Civil Affairs possess objective and reliable knowledge? Is the execution of USAR Civil Affairs essential to the functioning of society? Does society accept USAR Civil Affairs' role?

The question as to whether USAR Civil Affairs possesses objective and reliable information is not difficult to answer. Although somewhat more art than science – as opposed to medicine or geology, for example – civil affairs is a modern field of study based on World War II experiences and evolving military doctrine. The U.S. Army and the joint community have established civil affairs doctrine. This doctrine assists the CA practitioner with developing objective and reliable data. An example is Chapter 4 of the U.S. Army's manual, FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*. This chapter outlines civil

affairs methodology, civil considerations analysis, systems analysis of the operational environment, objectives-effects-tasks, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance. The authors of this chapter demonstrated how to organize systematically and objectively data in order to diagnose, infer, and act on a problem. CA has been studied and practiced, and a body of objective and reliable knowledge exists.

For the question of whether the execution of Civil Affairs is essential to the functioning of society, one can start with the Army's historical dependence upon the Civil Affairs branch. Regarded as the first use of civil affairs techniques, General Winfield Scott's occupation of Mexico in the 1840s endeared him to the local population. His operations "were more civic than military" in nature and resulted in "winning the good will of the local residents," thus enabling him to meet his strategic objectives.<sup>31</sup> In the Civil War, Union troops were compelled to manage the large number of displaced persons. After the Spanish-American War, the United States found itself occupying the Philippines and quelling an insurrection. To counter the insurgency, the U.S. Army "established local self-government and police forces, public health services, schools, and a Philippine defense force."<sup>32</sup> Often cited as a classic civil affairs success, "this civil-military velvet glove policy, with a Krag rifle in one hand and a schoolbook in the other, broke not only the military power of the rebels, but by 1902, their hold over the population as well."<sup>33</sup>

Although civil affairs activities occurred in World War I, the professional ascendancy of Civil Affairs, or Military Government as it was referred, came about in World War II. Military Government, as a distinct branch of the Army, traces its origin to the organization of Military Government units that administered post-war Germany and

Japan. These units were comprised of Army Reservists who were experts in functions that were essential to the reconstruction of the civil infrastructure. Functional specialties included economics, communications, public administration, utilities, transportation, and health. These Reserve officers in civilian life were lawyers, city managers, judges, and from other civic-based professions. The “10,000-plus personnel of the [U.S. Army’s] CAD [Civil Affairs Division] took charge of more than 80 million allied, co-belligerent, enemy, and partisan civilians, without one documented example of violent opposition.”<sup>34</sup> In the Korean War, CA Soldiers managed refugees, dispensed medical aid, and distributed food and fertilizer. Similarly, during the Vietnam War, “Civil Affairs was focused on “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”<sup>35</sup> The Army Vice Chief of Staff at the time stated that the three Civil Affairs companies serving in Vietnam were “worth their weight in gold.”<sup>36</sup>

The United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC), the predecessor to USACAPOC(A) that also commanded Army Reserve Special Forces, deployed individual Reserve Soldiers for Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY to Panama in 1989. CA units overcame challenges in order to provide medical assistance, to administer displaced civilians, and to assist the new government. Designated as the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) in 1990, the command dispatched active and reserve CA units to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT. In these operations, USAR Civil Affairs coordinated the acquisition of host nation support and assisted in providing life-support to displaced populations.

In 1994, the command mobilized and deployed CA units to Haiti in support of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. CA units restored electrical power to cities and remote hospitals, organized the clean-up of urban areas, and trained local police forces. A year later, units deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. In 1999, units were dispatched to Kosovo under the aegis of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. Both operations entailed the rehabilitation of a devastated civilian infrastructure. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) spurred the largest deployment of USAR CA personnel in the history of USACAPOC(A). Today, USAR Civil Affairs forces are integral to coalition efforts to counter insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan as they work with indigenous police forces to establish security. Furthermore, they are assisting local governments to institute good governance, to establish the rule of law, and to promote economic restoration.

Is the execution of USAR Civil Affairs essential to the functioning of society? Based on its history, the answer is “Yes.” Military conflict has, and will for the near future, involve the civilian populace. As long as the civilians are affected, or can influence the battle, there will be a role for civil affairs forces. CA operations are prevalent from peace through war. An army’s role in safeguarding society is unambiguous. CA forces contribute to the safeguarding of local societies on numerous levels. Through their participation, they contribute to the U.S. military profession’s management of violence – essential in safeguarding U.S. society.

Lastly, society does – albeit begrudgingly – accept the USAR Civil Affairs’ role. As Nadia Schadlow points out in her essay, *War and the Art of Governance*, “...governance operations clash with traditional notions of the “military profession”...”<sup>37</sup>

This clash occurs with all elements of Clausewitz's trinity – the government, the army, and the people. Rooted during the birth of the nation, there exists in U.S. society an inherent aversion to coupling the military with any aspect of governance. Paradoxically, society embraces how integral military civil affairs activities can accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic objectives essential to safeguarding societies.

*Career.* If subscribing to a traditional definition of career as Andrew Abbott's, "...single occupational skill or identity characterizing individuals for their entire working lives," USAR Civil Affairs, as well as all Reserve Soldiers, are immediately excluded.<sup>38</sup> This definition is too narrow and the qualifier *single* is unnecessary. The role as a CA officer is often more professionally defining for a Reserve officer than his civilian occupation. Considering this, USAR Civil Affairs theoretically meets the *career* requirement. The 2008 DoD Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, acknowledges that the RC provides operational capabilities, and as such, requires greater integration with the AC.<sup>39</sup> In addition to dismissing the outdated idea that the RC is a lesser readiness priority than the AC, the directive purports that the RC officer's military career is not, nor should it be, considered subservient to his civilian career. The growing identity as an USAR Civil Affairs officer professional is demonstrated in the voluntary overtime to their unit and in the multiple deployments required.<sup>40</sup> However, authorities must make improvements to the acquisition of the right officers and provide incentives to retain them.

*Expertise.* The USAR Civil Affairs officer corps, as a whole, possesses the required expertise. However, the required expertise across individuals and units is uneven. Huntington described the professional man as "...an expert with specialized

knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor” and “...capable of general application irrespective of time and place.”<sup>41</sup> In defining expertise with respect to the military officer, Richard A. Lacquement Jr., author of *Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdictions*, states:

The peculiar skill of the military officer is the development, operation, and leadership, of a human organization, a profession, whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people; for the Army officer such development, operation, and leadership occurs incident to sustaining America’s dominance in land warfare.<sup>42</sup>

One may find it peculiar for Civil Affairs to be associated with the application of a coercive force, but military civil affairs is simply a logical extension of Huntington’s management of violence. Although CA operations contribute to operations that are coercive, the five core tasks of civil affairs operations are not directly coercive in nature. However, “combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem.”<sup>43</sup> In fact, military professionalism may drift further away from the traditional view of the application of force and “we shall be obliged to redesign our militaries in future, and the likely configuration of the redesign would seem to be one that places a greater stress upon cooperative civil-military interaction.”<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the study of the expertise of the USAR Civil Affair officer requires expanding the concept of the management of violence. Recent studies of the military profession have subdivided expert knowledge into four clusters: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural.<sup>45</sup>

Military-technical expertise is the possession of those individual and leadership competencies essential to survival, to functioning as a member of a team, and to successful execution of the assigned mission. Military-technical expertise for the USAR CA officer includes expertise in the civil component of the operational environment. It

consists of regional orientation, language, cross-cultural communication, and civilian acquired skills.<sup>46</sup> Moral-ethical refers to the expertise USAR Civil Affairs displays in executing duties in a moral and ethical manner. Human-development expertise is the creation and maintenance of relevant expertise in members of USAR Civil Affairs. Political-cultural expertise enables USAR Civil Affairs to manage relationships with other segments of society, both national and international. Examples of such segments are the civilian populace being served, civilian leaders, and international humanitarian-related organizations.

The analysis of the CA officer, and in particular the USAR Civil Affairs officer, reveals that CA, as a subset of the military profession, meets the acceptance criteria of a profession but suggests the CA community needs to address key challenges and areas of needed improvement.

#### Areas of Challenge and Needed Improvement

*Jurisdiction.* With respect to jurisdictions, the nation's civilian leadership dictates the missions and domains for CA, the Army, and DoD. Nonetheless, USACAPOC(A) should present its case in professional forums that its employment be linked to DoD's expeditionary role. With the potential for greater DoS participation in nation-building, CA should welcome this trend and support its implementation in permissive environments (e.g., Kosovo).

*Legitimacy.* An important step in shoring up the legitimacy of Civil Affairs is establishing agreement within DoD as to who is the branch proponent. As noted previously, upon reassignment from USASOC to USARC, USAR Civil Affairs forces were no longer designated as a special operations force. Yet the question remains as

to why U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) remains responsible for the branch and the oversight of the entire USAR Civil Affairs officer life-cycle development. Although this decision is outside the purview of USACAPOC(A), the command would benefit by articulating urgency for resolving this issue so that potential lethargy in the proponent functions is avoided.

*Career.* A recommendation to solidify the *career* dimension of the profession is to continue the current trend to improve the pay and benefits of the Reserve officer. The high demand for officers to fill CA staffs for current operations has resulted in officers being assigned to USAR Civil Affairs units who, despite the noblest of intentions, do not possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities. Nor do some possess the potential to attain these required attributes. USACAPOC(A) should advocate for improved pay and benefits so that talented officers are not financially penalized by stalled civilian career progression due to frequent absences for military service and more qualified officers are attracted to, and retained in, CA positions.

*Expertise.* Military-technical is the expertise cluster where efforts for improvement are most needed. A contrast of the training and education between the AC Civil Affairs officer and his RC Civil Affairs counterpart reveals significant shortcomings for the RC officer. These disparities, which negatively affect individual performance of duty and unit mission accomplishment, occur in all three training domains: institutional, unit, and individual.

Regional orientation training is limited within the USAR Civil Affairs. In order to be qualified as a Civil Affairs officer, the AC officer must successfully complete the language and cultural training phase, approximately five months in duration, of the

Active Component Civil Affairs Qualification Course. The AC officer through this phase of study develops an understanding of the culture, history, and politics in a distant region of the world. Opportunities for USAR Civil Affairs officers to attend the 41-week course are limited. Unit training rarely mitigates this lack of institutional training. Although it is common for more unit training to occur, thirty days a year in addition to one weekend a month is the most training time that can be imposed on an USAR Civil Affairs officer without mobilizing the individual to active duty.<sup>47</sup> Nonetheless, the author's fifteen-year experience suggests that the majority of inactive duty for training (IDT) time, commonly referred to as weekend battle assemblies, is spent on administrative matters. Unit training mostly consists of completing annual individual skill requirements such as warrior task testing, weapons qualification, and physical fitness tests. The proponent should develop distance-learning (DL) packages for regional orientation. Although the time to complete these courses would be a scarce resource for the RC officer, it would be the best venue. Completion of these correspondence courses should entail the accrual of retirement points – thus providing the officer with a monetary incentive.

Language proficiency within USAR Civil Affairs, as with all of DoD, is a significant challenge. The AC Civil Affairs officer must graduate from formal language training to become Civil Affairs qualified. This AC Civil Affairs officer then holds a modicum of language proficiency that is often absent with his USAR Civil Affairs counterpart. In USAR Civil Affairs today, language proficient individuals, both officer and enlisted personnel, fill less than 3% of the language-required positions.<sup>48</sup> Despite the availability of training seats and ample funding to send USAR Civil Affairs officers to training, the

critical and limited resource is time.<sup>49</sup> Language training requires a significant commitment of time away from civilian employment. For example, to be minimally proficient in Arabic requires over 14 months of training. The typical USAR Civil Affairs officer, with competing demands for his time, can ill afford to dedicate such time for this study. There is no short-term fix to achieving language proficiency. Language proficiency needs to become a pre-commissioning requirement and training must be introduced in pre-commissioning programs. Afterwards, immersion training should be universally available and in concert with periodic testing. Developing language proficiency in the USAR Civil Affairs, as well as the entire DoD, is a long-term venture.

Similarly, the lack of adequate regional orientation and language training hinders cross-cultural communication expertise, which is another challenge in USAR Civil Affairs institutional training. To counter this, greater availability and use of overseas deployment training (ODT) is needed. Even if limited to one or two weeks, working within a foreign culture will greatly enhance an officer's cross-cultural communication ability.

The USAR Civil Affairs officer is expected to bring his civilian-acquired skills to bear. After all, possession of civilian acquired skills serves as the rationale for having CA predominantly in the Reserves. However, the civilian-acquired expertise is oftentimes exaggerated. At the brigade and Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) levels, individuals placed in functional specialties do not always possess the required skill sets. For example, a colonel serving in the economics team chief position may have little to no experience, nor formal education, in economics. The mismatch is a direct result of too few, truly qualified personnel available and an abundance of unfilled positions. In

addition, the pool of talented managerial officers grows fewer. These talented individuals, typically having the most demanding civilian jobs, depart from, or never to join, the Reserves. An observation by the sociologist Charles C. Moskos notes:

...officers in the reserves are increasingly likely to come from a narrow band of civilian backgrounds: (1) large-scale organizations responsible to reserve obligations, (2) those who have reached a plateau in their civilian work, (3) those with undemanding work, and (4) those who are underemployed. The career force in the reserves is overrepresented with government workers, school teachers, and the self-employed in marginal businesses. Largely missing from the officer corps of the reserves is the truly successful business executive or professional.<sup>50</sup>

Units must encourage, accept, and place into functional specialty positions only personnel who have demonstrated the requisite minimal level of functional specialty competency. Personnel not meeting the standard would be better suited in Civil Affairs generalist positions.

### Conclusion

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Civil Affairs, and particularly USAR Civil Affairs officers, are an essential component of the military profession. While their role in the profession is theoretically defensible, serious issues exist concerning how well the Army is preparing these officers to practice their profession – raising valid concerns for the Civil Affairs community and its standing in the military profession. There are several things that the USAR Civil Affairs community can execute or advocate to improve its standing as a member of the Army profession.

### Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup> MG David A. Morris, "Command Overview," briefing slides, Norfolk, VA, Civil Affairs Association, November 08, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.40 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 2006), 1-1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Army Pamphlet 600-3 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 11, 2007), 179.

<sup>6</sup> MG David A. Morris, "Command Overview."

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 2005), 1-10.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 9.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>11</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 5.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>13</sup> Andrew Abbott, *The Systems of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 33.

<sup>14</sup> Don M. Snider, "The U.S. Army as Profession" in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed., ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 11-12.

<sup>15</sup> Dallas D. Owens, "From Reserve to Full Partner: Transforming Reserve Professionals" in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed., ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 570-571.

<sup>16</sup> Abbott, *The Systems of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*, 40.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 179.

<sup>20</sup> Richard B. Meyers, *National Military Strategy of the United States: A Strategy of Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 20.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Directive Number 3000.05 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 28, 2005), 2.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ron Lyon, *Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror* (Brisbane: University of Queensland, 2004), 6.

<sup>24</sup> Larry Minear, Marc Sommers and Ted van Baarda, "NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis" (Providence, RI: Brown University, 2000): 57, quoted in Volker Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations," *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 11, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2006): 13.

<sup>25</sup> Brent C. Backus, "We've Done This Before," *Small Wars Journal Magazine*, February 2006, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v4/bankus.htm> (accessed February 14, 2009).

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, "Active Component Civil Affairs Redesign," briefing slides, Fort Bragg: NC, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, February 17, 2005.

<sup>27</sup> *The White House President Barack Obama – The Agenda – Defense*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense> (accessed January 31, 2009).

<sup>28</sup> *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Home Page*, <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/> (accessed December 8, 2008).

<sup>29</sup> Oscar DeSoto, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: A Whole-of-Government Approach to Preparing and Responding to Conflict," briefing slides, October 31, 2007, linked from *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Home Page* at "Foreign Policy," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/index.html> (accessed February 24, 2009).

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<sup>31</sup> United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *History of Civil Affairs: Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course* (Fort Bragg, NC: States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 1992), 1-6.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters* 23, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 92.

<sup>38</sup> Owens, "From Reserve to Full Partner: Transforming Reserve Professionals," 573.

<sup>39</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, Directive Number 1200.17 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 29, 2008), 1.

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<sup>41</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 8.

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<sup>43</sup> Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," 86.

<sup>44</sup> Lyon, *Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Terror*, 20.

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<sup>46</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 179.

<sup>47</sup> Title 10, United States Code, subtitle E, part I, chapter 1005, sec. 10147.

<sup>48</sup> Kathryn Anderson, Language Training Coordinator, United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, telephone interview by author, February 23, 2009.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Moskos, *The Sociology of the Army Reserves: An Organizational Assessment*, 11.